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It is commonly assumed that positive mood improves human creativity and that the
neurotransmitter dopamine might mediate this association. However, given the non-linear
relation between dopamine and flexibility in divergent thinking (Akbari Chermahini and
Hommel, 2010), the impact of mood on divergent kinds of creativity might depend on a
given individual’s tonic dopamine level. We tested this possibility in adults by assessing
mood, performance in a divergent thinking task [the Alternate Uses Task (AUT)], and
eye blink rates (EBRs), a well-established clinical marker of the individual dopamine
level, before and after positive mood or negative mood induction. As expected, the
association between flexibility in divergent thinking performance and EBR followed an
inverted U-shape function (with best performance for medium levels), positive mood
induction raised EBRs and only individuals with below-median EBRs, but not those with
above-median EBRs, benefited from positive mood. These observations provide support
for dopamine-based approaches to the impact of mood on creativity and challenge the
generality of the widely held view that positive mood facilitates creativity.
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Creativity is arguably the most potent human resource both for
the advancement of mankind in general and people’s individual
progress and success in daily life in particular. And yet, the cog-
nitive and neural mechanisms underlying creative behavior are
poorly understood. Researchers agree that at least some forms of
creativity vary with mood and two recent meta-analyses have con-
cluded that performance in tasks tapping divergent (brainstorm-
like) thinking can be reliably improved by inducing positive mood
(Baas et al., 2008; Davis, 2009). This conclusion fits with earlier
considerations of Isen (1987), who claimed that positive affect
(PA) impacts cognitive processing by (1) increasing the num-
ber of cognitive elements available for association; (2) defocusing
attention so to increase the breadth of those elements treated as
relevant to the problem; and (3) increasing cognitive flexibility.
Exactly how positive mood manages to improve creativity
is not clear yet, but in approaches that tackle this issue the
neurotransmitter dopamine (possibly in concert with other neu-
rotransmitter systems: Cools et al., 2008) plays a major role.
Notably, Ashby et al. (1999) have pointed out that phasic changes
in dopamine levels, mood changes, and changes in creativity
(especially in cognitive flexibility) may be strongly interrelated.
Their approach is inspired by insights into the neurobiology of
reward, the encounter of which has been shown to induce both
PA and phasic increases of dopamine levels (e.g., Beninger, 1991;
Bozarth, 1991; Phillips et al., 1992; Schultz, 1992). Accordingly,
Ashby and colleagues (1999) suggest that improved mood states
are accompanied by phasic increases in dopaminergic supply pro-
vided by frontal and striatal pathways. These phasic increases
might facilitate switching from one task set or item to another,
thereby increasing cognitive flexibility in creativity tasks. This sce-
nario is consistent with results from neural-network modeling
(Cohen and Servan-Schreiber, 1992; Ashby et al., 1999) and the
observation that divergent thinking performance interacts with
individual differences in the DRD2 TAQ IA gene—which affects
receptor density in the striatal dopaminergic pathway (Reuter
et al., 2006). Moreover, the personality trait of “seek,” which
has been claimed to rely on dopaminergic pathways (Panksepp,
1998), has been reported to be positively related to creativity
(Reuter et al., 2005).
To assess the connection between creativity and dopamine,
Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2010) related individual per-
formance in a divergent thinking task to spontaneous eye-blink
rates (EBRs), an indirect but well-established clinical marker of
the individual dopamine level (Karson, 1983; Blin et al., 1990;
Kleven and Koek, 1996). Flexibility in divergent thinking (or cog-
nitive flexibility for short) did in fact covary with EBR but the
function relating these two measures was non-linear and followed
an inverted U-shape1. As indicated in Figure 1, an idealized func-
tion modeled after Akbari Chermahini and Hommel’s findings,
individuals with medium EBR were performing better than indi-
viduals with low or higher rates did (individuals with particularly
1Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2010) assessed divergent thinking by
means of Guilford (1967) Alternate Uses Task, which was also used in the
present study. Responses in this task are commonly scored according to flexi-
bility, originality, fluency, and elaboration, to quantify the number of different
categories used, the uniqueness and number of responses, and the amount of
detail, respectively. As Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2010) found sys-
tematic, reliable findings for flexibility only (an observation that we replicated
in the present study), and because most theoretical claims relate to flexibility
(e.g., Ashby et al., 1999; Hommel, 2012), the present study was focusing on
this variable.
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FIGURE 1 | Hypothetical function (modeled after Akbari Chermahini
and Hommel, 2010) relating flexibility in divergent thinking to eye
blink rate (EBR), an estimate of the individual dopamine level. The
estimate of the group mean is taken from Akbari Chermahini and Hommel
(2010). Note that an increase in dopamine (EBR) of  would strongly
increase performance of the hypothetical individual “X,” only mildly improve
performance of “Y,” and impair performance of “Z.”
high rates were not tested in this study,2). If we take EBRs as
a marker of the current dopamine level (presumably integrat-
ing tonic and phasic levels), this has a number of rather serious
implications that we set out to test in the present study.
First, it suggests that EBR can be used to monitor the impact of
mood manipulations. If it is the case that inducing positive mood
increases the current dopamine level and if EBR indeed reflects
this level, we should be able to demonstrate that inducing posi-
tive mood leads to an increase in EBR. Whether we should expect
the induction of negative mood to decrease EBR was less clear.
On the one hand, there is evidence that dopamine neurons are
activated by events that are more rewarding than predicted and
depressed by events that less rewarding than predicted (Schultz,
1992), suggesting that positive and negative mood might increase
and decrease EBR in a symmetric fashion. On the other hand,
however, numerous findings suggest that negative mood is not
just the opposite of positive mood (e.g., Baas et al., 2008), which
fits with the increasing evidence that while positive mood is heav-
ily affected by dopamine, negative mood is more strongly linked
to serotonin (e.g., Cools et al., 2008; Dayan and Huys, 2008).
Considering this possibility, EBR and cognitive flexibility might
be more impacted by positive than by negative mood.
2Informal observations from our lab revealed that people with very high EBR
levels are rare in our student population and more often than not report to
have family members with schizophrenia. This fits with the distribution of
EBRs in Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2010) and in the present study,
where the EBRs of the majority of participants falls on the left, ascending part
of the inverted U-shaped function relating EBR to divergent thinking. If we in
the following distinguish between below- and above-median EBRs, it should
therefore be kept in mind that even above-median EBRs in the present study
are actually representing medium EBRs in the general population. In other
words, even though we will compare individuals with low vs. high EBRs, the
present study actually compares individuals with low vs. medium EBRs.
Second, if we take both mood and EBR changes as reflections
of phasic dopaminergic changes, the amount of mood and EBR
changes should be systematically related to the degree of change
in cognitive flexibility. That is, elevated mood and increased EBRs
should be associated with improved flexibility, whereas negative-
going mood might rather be associated with decreased EBRs and
impaired flexibility.
Third, Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2010) observation
that cognitive flexibility relates to EBR in an inverted U-shaped
fashion suggests that the impact of increasing (or decreasing) the
individual dopamine level on flexibility should depend on the
basic level of the corresponding individual. Consider, for instance,
an individual with a relatively low level of dopamine, as the hypo-
thetical person “X” in Figure 1. In view of Akbari Chermahini
and Hommel’s findings, this individual would be expected to per-
form rather poorly with respect to cognitive flexibility. Inducing
positive mood would be expected to increase the dopamine level
by some hypothetical amount  and thereby move this individ-
ual more toward the central zone of the performance function,
which is associated with the best performance. Hence, positive
mood induction should be beneficial for individuals with low
EBR. Positive mood should also be beneficial for individuals with
higher EBRs, as long as the rate falls on the ascending flank of the
function. Accordingly, the hypothetical person “Y” would show a
benefit, which however would be smaller than that shown by “X.”
However, for individuals with even higher EBR, such as person
“Z” in Figure 1, positive mood should no longer improve flexi-
bility but have no effect or even impair performance. Hence, we
would expect that people with a low pre-experimental EBR would
be expected to benefit from positive mood more than people with
medium or relatively high pre-experimental EBRs do.
We assessed these three hypotheses in the following way:
Participants were first tested on general, pre-experimental mood
(for both their general and their current mood state), on per-
formance in divergent thinking, and on their pre-experimental
EBR. Then two subgroups of participants underwent a positive
mood and negative mood induction, respectively, before again
being tested on mood, divergent thinking, and EBR.
METHODS
Eighty-one native Dutch students of Leiden University volun-
teered in exchange for course credit or pay. The study consisted
of three phases, which together took 45min to complete. First, all
participants filled out an inventory assessing their general mood
Positive and Negative Affect (NA) Scales (PANAS) and a mood
inventory assessing their current mood state (MI1), before per-
forming a divergent-creativity task (Alternate Uses Task: AUT1);
finally, their spontaneous EBR were measured (EBR1). In the sec-
ond phase, 43 participants received a positive mood induction
while 38 participants received a negative mood induction. In the
third phase, another version of the mood inventory (MI2) was
filled out, EBR2 was measured, and another version of the diver-
gent thinking task was performed (AUT2). The order of the two
versions of the mood inventory and the divergent thinking task
was counter-balanced across participants. EBR2 was measured
after mood induction while subject continually was thinking
about either happy or sad memory.
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POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCALES (PANAS)
The PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) is 20-items self-report mood
scale that measures general (“how do you feel generally?”) PA and
NA. It comprises of 10 positive and 10 negative adjectives rated
on a Likert scale from 1 (very little or not at all) to 5 (very or
extremely). We used a Dutch version of the scale with high inter-
nal consistencies for the PA (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.84) and the
NA (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.80) subscale (c.f., Hill et al., 2005).
MOOD INVENTORY (MI)
Instead of presenting the PANAS repeatedly (which would have
invited memory biases), we used two Dutch versions of a mood
inventory (developed by Phillips et al., 2002, and similar to the
scale of Isen et al., 1987) to assess current mood in the first
and the third phase of the experiment. Three of the five items
of this inventory assess the hedonic quality of affect (Phillips
et al., 2002). One version (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.75) used the
following adjective pairs (Dutch words are given in parentheses)
to measure valence: happy–sad (blij-verdrietig), peaceful–anxious
(vredig-angstig), and carefree–serious (zorgeloos-serieus). The sec-
ond version (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85) used the pairs: positive–
negative (positief-negatief ), calm–uptight (kalm-opgewonden),
and bright–dispirited (helder-serieus). Positive and negative
words were presented on the left and right side of a page, respec-
tively. Nine-point Likert scales separated the words of each pair
and participants were asked to rate their current mood state (fol-
lowing Phillips et al., 2002). For analytical purposes the mood
scores were reversed and then totaled, so that higher scores
indicate more positive mood.
ALTERNATE USES TASK (AUT)
Following Guilford (1967), participants were asked to write down
as many possible uses for a common household item as they can
within 5min. Two different items were used: cup and pencil. The
order of the two items was balanced across participants, so that
half of the participants received the cup item before and pencil
after mood induction, while the other half received the opposite
sequence. Responses were scored with respect to flexibility, origi-
nality, fluency, and elaboration (Guilford, 1967). However, given
that flexibility is most strongly and reliably related to EBR mea-
sures (Akbari Chermahini andHommel, 2010), we focused on the
flexibility score1, which is derived from the number of different
categories being used for each item.
EYE BLINK RATE (EBR)
A BioSemi ActiveTwo system (BioSemi Inc., Amsterdam) was
used to record the EBR. We recorded with two horizontal (one
left, one right) and two vertical (one upper, one lower of left
eye) Ag-AgCl electrodes, for 6min eyes-open segments under
resting conditions. The vertical electrooculogram (EOG), which
recorded the voltage difference between two electrodes placed
above and below the left eye, was used to detect eye blinks. The
horizontal EOG, which recorded the voltage difference between
electrodes placed lateral to the external canthi, was used to mea-
sure horizontal eye movements. As spontaneous EBR is stable
during daytime but increases in the evening (around 8:30 pm, see
Babarto et al., 2000), we never registered after 5 pm.We also asked
participants to avoid smoking before the recording. Participants
were comfortably sitting in front of a blank poster with a cross
in the center, located about 1m from the participant. The par-
ticipant was alone in the room and asked to look at the cross
in a relaxed state to record EBR1. After mood induction (either
positive or negative) EBR2 was recorded. The individual EBR was
calculated by dividing the total number of eye blinks during the
6min measurement interval by 6.
MOOD INDUCTION
We used the common mental-imagination procedure (e.g., Strack
et al., 1985; Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Phillips et al., 2002; DeSteno
et al., 2004; Baas et al., 2008) to induce positive and negative
mood. Participants were asked to write down a couple of sen-
tences about an event of their life that made them happy (in a
calm, relaxed way) or sad (in a calm, non-angryway), respectively,
for 5min. Calmness was emphasized to keep the two emotional
states comparable regarding activation and arousal. EBR2 was
recorded right after the mood induction; participants were asked
to stop writing but to keep thinking about the event during the
measurement interval. The session was completed by filling in the
MI2 and the AUT2.
RESULTS
Before assessing our three experimental hypotheses, we tested
whether the experimental groups were comparable before the dif-
ferentmoods were induced (see Comparability of groups), whether
the mood manipulation actually worked (see Manipulation
check), and whether performance in the creativity task related
to individual EBR like it did in the study of Akbari Chermahini
and Hommel (2010) [see Replication of Akbari Chermahini and
Hommel (2010)]. All reported p values are for two-tailed test-
ing unless indicated otherwise (one-tailed tests were used for
predicted correlations).
COMPARABILITY OF GROUPS
A set of independent t-test were conducted to check whether the
two experimental groups were comparable before undergoing the
mood induction. There was not any hint to any pre-experimental
difference between the two groups with respect to either the pos-
itive or negative subscale of PANAS, and the hedonic valence
scores computed from the MI1, nor did any of these scales corre-
late with EBR1, all ps > 0.05. Table 1 provides the relevant infor-
mation about themood states in two experimental groups and the
four subgroups. Interestingly, the lack of a correlation between
EBR1 and pre-experimental mood suggests that mood does not
depend on the tonic dopamine level but, if anything, on pha-
sic changes. There was also no hint to a pre-experimental group
difference with regard to pre-experimental EBR1 (p = 0.14) or
flexibility (p = 0.88).
MANIPULATION CHECK
Another set of paired sample t-tests on the hedonic valence score
in MI1 and MI2 served to check whether the mood manipula-
tion worked. As expected, participants were significantly more
happy after positive-mood induction than before (M = 20.95
vs. 18.11), t(42) = 5.74, p < 0.001,η2 = 0.44, and significantly
less happy after negative mood induction (M = 13.07 vs. 19.65),
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Table 1 | Means and standard deviations for pre-experimental general mood states (PANAS: positive and negative scales), and current mood
states (only hedonic valence score) before (MI1) and after (MI2) mood induction in the two experimental groups, and four subgroups, as a
function of low vs. (relatively) high pre-experimental eye blink rate (EBR).
State mood index Mood induction groups
Positive Negative
Total Low EBR High EBR Total Low EBR High EBR
(n = 43) (n = 21) (n = 22) (n = 38) (n = 19) (n = 19)
PANAS–PA M 34.1 33.1 35.1 34.1 33.2 35.1
S.D. 4.5 4.9 3.9 5.5 4.6 6.1
PANAS-NA M 16.1 16.2 16.4 16.2 16.4 16.1
S.D. 4.8 4.9 4.9 6.1 7 5.4
MI1 M 18.1 17.5 18.6 19.9 18.4 20.8
S.D. 3.1 2.6 3.5 4.0 4.6 3.2
MI2 M 20.9 20.4 21.6 13.4 13.0 13.7
S.D. 3.1 2.9 3.1 4.7 4.3 5.2
Note: PANAS-PA, PANAS positive affect subscale; PANAS-NA, PANAS negative affect subscale.
t(37) = 7.76, p < 0.001. η2 = 0.62. This suggests that the mental-
imagery procedure was effective in inducing the respective mood
states.
REPLICATION OF AKBARI CHERMAHINI AND HOMMEL (2010)
The relationship between flexibility in the divergent thinking
task (AUT1) and EBR1 followed an inverted U-shaped function
(Figure 2, quadratic fit = 0.36, p = 0.005), whereas the linear fit
was poor (0.06, p = 0.62)—a pattern that replicates our previous
observation (Akbari Chermahini and Hommel, 2010). As in our
previous study, there was no significant relation between EBR and
one of the other scores of divergent thinking.
HYPOTHESIS 1: ARE INDUCED POSITIVE (OR NEGATIVE) MOOD
CHANGES REFLECTED IN CORRESPONDING INCREASES
(AND DECREASES) IN EBR?
Paired sample t-tests revealed systematic changes in EBR after
mood induction: As expected, the induction of positive mood led
to a significant increase in EBR (M = 18.79 vs. 14.1), t(42) = 3.8,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.26. Negative mood induction reduced EBR
numerically (M = 16.78 vs. 17.39) but this effect was far from
significance, t(37) = 0.64, p = 0.53, η2 = 0.01. To summarize,
positive-going mood changes are systematically reflected in cor-
responding EBR changes, while negative-going mood changes
are not.
HYPOTHESIS 2: ARE POSITIVE-GOING (NEGATIVE-GOING)MOOD AND
INCREASED (REDUCED) EBRs ASSOCIATEDWITH INCREASED
(REDUCED) FLEXIBILITY?
Paired sample t-tests assessed the impact of mood induction on
performance in the creativity task by comparing flexibility scores
before and after the mood manipulation. As expected, the induc-
tion of positive mood enhanced flexibility (M = 7.1 vs. 5.7),
t(42) = 3.26, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.20. The induction of negative
mood reduced flexibility numerically (M = 5.26 vs. 5.52), but this
effect was far from significance, t(37) = 0.84, p = 0.41, η2 = 0.02.
FIGURE 2 | Flexibility in the divergent thinking task as a function of
spontaneous eye blink rate (EBR) per min. Regression line for best
(quadratic) fit.
Overall, the correlation between change in cognitive flexi-
bility (AUT2-AUT1) and change in mood (MI2-MI: hedonic
valence) was positive and reliable, r = 0.24, p < 0.018, one-
tailed. However, separate analyses revealed that the correlation
was positive and pronounced in the positive mood induction
group, r = 0.44, p < 0.001, one-tailed, but negative and unreli-
able in the negative mood induction group, r = −0.18, p = 0.28.
Correlations between change in EBR (EBR2-EBR1) and
change in flexibility (AUT2-AUT1: flexibility score) showed a
similar pattern. Overall, the correlation was positive and reli-
able, r = 0.19, p = 0.047, one-tailed. Separate analyses of the two
mood induction groups showed that individuals were becoming
more flexible in divergent thinking to the degree that positive
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mood induction increased their EBR, r = 0.29, p = 0.03, one-
tailed (Figure 3, line: P)—the pattern we expected. In contrast,
however, participants in the negative mood group tended to
become more (rather than less) creative to the degree that neg-
ative mood induction decreased their EBR, r = −0.23, p = 0.17
(Figure 3, line: N)—a pattern that we did not expect.
To summarize, the changes in EBR induced by positive mood
induction were systematically related to changes in cognitive
flexibility. Although the negative mood induction produced (neg-
ative) mood shifts of even greater magnitude, it did not cause
significant changes in either EBR or cognitive flexibility. Also,
changes in EBR and cognitive flexibility as well as changes in
mood and cognitive flexibility were unrelated in the negative
mood induction group.
HYPOTHESIS 3: DO INDIVIDUALS WITH LOW PRE-EXPERIMENTAL EBR
BENEFIT MORE (IN TERMS OF FLEXIBILITY) FROM POSITIVE MOOD
MORE THAN INDIVIDUALS WITH HIGHER EBR DO?
We assessed this hypothesis by categorizing participants according
to their pre-experimental EBR (EBR1): participants with EBRs
below the median were considered low-EBR individuals while
participants with EBRs above the median were considered (rel-
atively) high-EBR individuals (which actually represent median-
EBR individuals2). As expected, and shown in Figure 4, the
induction of positive mood improved flexibility only in low-EBR
individuals (from 5.8 to 8.0 categories, t(21) = 3.54, p = 0.002,
η2 = 0.37) but not in high-EBR participants (5.7 vs. 6.1), t(20) =
0.87, p = 0.4).
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to investigate the relation-
ship between mood, flexibility in divergent thinking, and EBR—a
FIGURE 3 | Mood-induced change in divergent thinking performance
(flexibility score post minus flexibility score pre mood induction) as a
function of the mood-induced change in spontaneous eye blink
rate (EBR). Empty circles and regression line N for participants with
negative-mood induction; filled circles and regression line P for participants
with positive-mood induction.
marker of individual dopamine levels. Importantly, we were able
to fully replicate the inverted U-shaped function relating flexibil-
ity to pre-experimental EBR, first reported by Akbari Chermahini
and Hommel (2010), which reinforces the notion that flexibility
relates to individual dopamine levels.
Our first hypothesis assumes that mood changes are reflected
in corresponding changes of the EBR: positive-going mood
should increase EBR while negative mood might either reduce
EBR or leave it unaffected. Mood changes and EBR changes
were indeed correlated and positive clearly increased EBRs; neg-
ative mood, in turn, had no reliable impact. This suggests that
EBR is a sensitive measure of (some of) the neural processes
underlying (positive) mood changes, presumably changes in the
individual dopamine level. Even though the functional connec-
tion between dopaminergic activity and EBR is not yet well
understood and even though the exact quantitative relationship
between dopamine level and EBR is not yet known, the finding
of a reliable correlation between mood and EBR changes has sub-
stantial methodological implications. At the moment, not many
ways to assess the current dopamine level of individuals are avail-
able: Apart from EBR, dopaminergic activity can be assessed by
means of Positron Emission Tomography (Volkow et al., 1996),
a rather invasive method, and the advent of high-field MRI may
make it possible to scan the current activity level of dopamine-
producing nuclei. Hence, in comparison, measuring EBR is a
relatively simple, cheap, and non-invasive method that provides
at least some insight into dopaminergic activity.
Our second hypothesis assumes that experimentally-induced
changes in perceived mood and EBR predict corresponding
changes in the flexibility of divergent thinking. As expected, flex-
ibility was improved through the induction of positive mood
but not reliable affected by the induction of negative mood.
FIGURE 4 | Change in divergent thinking performance (flexibility score
post minus flexibility score pre mood induction) as a function of mood
induction (positive or negative) and individual eye blink rate (EBR)
level (low or high).
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Moreover, the degree of this improvement was predicted by the
individual degree to which the mood induction manipulation
was successful. Likewise, EBR increased through the induction
of positive mood but was not reliable affected by negative mood
induction. Finally, the experimentally-induced positive changes
in EBR reliably predicted the increase of flexibility. If we assume
that EBR reflects changes in dopaminergic activity, this suggests
that cognitive flexibility is systematically affected, and perhaps
even driven by phasic changes in dopamine. In any case, mood,
EBR, and flexibility are related to each other exactly as predicted
from dopamine-based approaches to creativity. Interestingly, the
predicted relationship was found for the impact of positive mood
only, but not for negative mood effects, which provides support
for the notion that the functional (e.g., Baas et al., 2008) and neu-
romodulatory (e.g., Cools et al., 2008; Dayan and Huys, 2008)
mechanisms underlying positive and negative mood are different.
According to our third hypothesis, this interrelationship—
in view of the fully replicated inverted U-shaped relationship
between EBR and flexibility—suggests that individuals with low
tonic dopamine levels might benefit more from the induction
of positive mood than individuals with medium or high levels
do. Indeed, mood-induced improvement of flexibility was only
observed in individuals with a pre-experimentally low EBR and
a presumably corresponding low tonic dopamine level. Not only
does this fit with the non-linear relation between EBR in flex-
ibility reported by Akbari Chermahini and Hommel (2010), it
is also likely to explain why unreliable findings and failures to
replicate are still abundant in studies on the connection between
mood and creativity (Baas et al., 2008; Davis, 2009). Indeed,
depending on the particular characteristics and the correspond-
ing distribution of individual dopamine levels in a given sample,
the exact same mood-related manipulation can produce signif-
icant effects or null results alike, especially if the sample size is
small.
Taken together, our findings support the assumption that pha-
sic changes in dopamine levels might provide the common cur-
rency underlying the relationship between mood and creativity,
as suggested by Ashby et al. (1999) and others, and they provide
the hithertomost direct evidence for the underlying interrelation-
ship between mood, creativity, and dopamine. In particular, our
findings suggest that elevated mood indeed increases the individ-
ual dopamine level and improves aspects of human creativity, as
assessed by the flexibility score in our divergent thinking task.
At the same time, however, we were able to demonstrate that
the reliability and, presumably, the direction of the impact of
mood and associated phasic dopamine changes depend on the
individual tonic dopamine level (but not the basic mood level!).
This questions the generality of claims regarding the positive
impact of mood on creativity and calls for closer considera-
tion of individual differences. As our findings show, better mood
may or may not facilitate (and may in some cases even impair)
creative performance of a given individual. Depending on the
specific characteristics of a given sample, this complication may
well conceal the true connections between creativity, mood, and
dopaminergic activity in empirical studies and applied settings.
In the light of our findings, a number of further ques-
tions present themselves. For instance, it remains to be seen
whether a comparable interrelationship exists between mood,
dopamine, and convergent thinking—which apparently relates
to tonic dopamine levels in different, and in some sense oppo-
site, ways than divergent thinking does (Akbari Chermahini and
Hommel, 2010). Recently we observed that engaging in conver-
gent thinking leads to more negative mood (Akbari Chermahini
and Hommel, 2011), which would fit with this expectation.
Moreover, it seems important to clarify the functional relation-
ship between mood and phasic dopaminergic changes. After all,
mood is a concept that relates to a personal level of description
and relates to a person having and experiencing it. In contrast,
changes in dopaminergic activity refer to the systems level of
description, which may or may not correspond to personal-level
concepts in a one-to-one fashion. Hence, it would be important
to understand whether and to what degree dopaminergic changes
are the neural reflection of being in a particular mood, or whether
they are mere by-products of particular mood states.
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